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INTRODUCTION
Douglas A. Kahn*
While the estate and gift tax area has by no means been ignored in
the legal literature, it has not been one of the more popular subjects.
For that reason, a symposium on transfer taxation would be welcome
at any time, but this is an especially propitious moment for one to
appear.
In 1976, after some twenty-five years of relatively little congres-
sional attention, the transfer tax and related laws were radically
altered. In the backwash of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, a flurry of
amendments were adopted clarifying, modifying, and correcting the
work of that Act. For example, the effective date of the carryover
basis rule for property acquired from a decedent was postponed sev-
eral times by Congress, and the rule itself was finally repealed in
1980. This increase in congressional activity has sparked a renewed
interest in the field.
In 1981, as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), Con-
gress made another radical alteration of the transfer tax system. The
moment is therefore ripe for scholarly attention to the current state of
the transfer tax system and to the type of planning for clients that is
dictated by the tax law changes of the past six years. Among the
planning considerations that might be considered is the advice which
lawyers should give to their clients concerning marital deductions and
the Qualified Terminal Interest Property (QTIP) device.
Most of the commentators who have addressed the question of the
optimum division of a testator's property between a surviving spouse
and the rest of the testator's family have recommended that tax defer-
ral be the principal goal-assuming, of course, that such a division is
not contrary to the personal objectives of the testator. In other words,
if maximization of the value of assets that ultimately will pass to the
descendants of the decedent is a major objective, the widely held
assumption is that this objective can best be accomplished by leaving
the surviving spouse all the testator's property in excess of the maxi-
mum amount that can be included in the testator's taxable estate
without incurring any federal estate tax. The testator will thus utilize
the unified credit (and possibly the credit for state death taxes) by
bypassing the surviving spouse so that those assets will not be subject
to a death tax upon the spouse's demise. The amount of the bypass
bequest plus all appreciation thereon will be exempt from transfer tax
on the death of both the testator and the spouse. The balance of the
testator's estate will be left to the spouse in such a manner as to qualify
for the marital deduction so that the property will not be taxed at the
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testator's death. However, the property passing to the spouse plus any
appreciation thereon will be subject to transfer taxation on either the
spouse's death or on transfer of all or part of the property during the
spouse's life (other than gifts within the annual exclusion). Thus, the
commentators have opted for tax deferral at the time of the testator's
death rather than for a division designed to equalize the size of the
testator's estate and that of the surviving spouse.
In a recent article, an author examined this question of division
and, contrary to the current conventional wisdom, concluded that,
while tax deferral is sometimes preferable, it is not always so.' The
preferability of balancing the size of the spouses' estates rather than
deferring the tax payable on the decedent's death depends upon a
number of factors, including the size of the spouses' estates; the num-
ber of years the spouse survives the decedent; whether the decedent's
properties appreciate in value after his death and, if so, at what
annual rate; and whether the surviving spouse is a person who is likely
to be psychologically prepared to make annual gifts of substantial
amounts. Other factors that must be considered are the liquidity
position of the decedent's estate and the likely significance, if any, of
obtaining a new income tax basis for assets included in the gross estate
of the surviving spouse on that spouse's demise. Obviously, there are
many contingencies to be taken into account, and perhaps since the
difficulty of predicting so many events is so great, and since the tax
reduction potentially available from balancing estates even under
optimum circumstances is likely to be relatively small, the parties
might do better to follow conventional wisdom and opt for death tax
deferral. In any event, this is an extremely important issue, warrant-
ing further study.
In addition to the numerous technical questions that a new enact-
ment inevitably spawns, the 1981 Act's expansion of the marital de-
duction to cover QTIP may subject lawyers to agonizing conflict of
interest issues. These issues have long been present in the estate plan-
ning area, but the availability of the QTIP as a vehicle for qualifying
for the marital deduction increases the prospect that such conflicts
will arise.
One of the important characteristics of QTIP is that such property
can qualify for a marital deduction even though the surviving spouse
has only an income interest therein and has no power to dispose of the
property either during life or at death. A major reason for utilizing a
QTIP arrangement is that the testator does not trust the spouse suffi-
ciently to give that spouse control of the disposition of the property,
albeit there are other reasons for using this type of arrangement.
1. Garlock, Estate Tax Unlimited Marital Deduction Has Limited Advantage in Larger
Estates, 56 J. TAX'N 236 (1982).
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In many instances, a husband and wife will consult an attorney
together to have a common estate plan designed and to have the
appropriate documents drafted. If the lawyer agrees to represent
them both, and if one of the testators privately informs the lawyer of a
lack of confidence in the other's judgment, it seems clear that the
lawyer should advise the testator of the availability of a QTIP ar-
rangement. Indeed, regardless of whether such a private disclosure is
made, the lawyer may be obligated to inform his clients of all reason-
able planning options, including the QTIP, and the consequences of
each option.. Is a lawyer required to present this QTIP alternative to
clients even if there is reason to believe that raising its availability to
the clients may engender a serious dispute?
Let us assume that the lawyer discusses the QTIP option only in a
private conference with a testator who then chooses to utilize that
device in a will. Is the lawyer then bound to inform the testator's
spouse of the meaning of the QTIP provision, its effect of precluding
him or her from having any control over the assets, and the likely
reason that the testator chose that approach? In informing the spouse,
will the lawyer thereby violate a confidence of the testator client; and
will the lawyer thereby risk causing a conflict between the spouses and
possibly even a breakup of their marriage? If the lawyer seeks to avoid
this dilemma by refusing to represent both parties, which one should
be represented-the one who controls the marital estate and with
whom the lawyer likely has a continuing professional relationship or
the other? If the former, how does the lawyer explain to the spouse
that because each spouse may have conflicting interests, each should
have separate counsel? Is such an explanation itself likely to instigate a
marital conflict?
Of course, the threshold issue in any study of estate and gift taxation
is the broad impact of the ERTA changes. The significance of revenue
collection from transfer taxation has always been minor, and recently
its relatively small contribution to the revenue collected by the gov-
ernment has diminished as the percentage of collections represented
by transfer taxes has decreased. Only a little more than one percent of
the revenue collected by the federal government is attributable to
transfer taxes. The taxes apply only to a very small percentage of the
population. Nevertheless, transfer taxes are extremely important to
the families that are subject to them, and such families usually have
the means to hire counsel to deal with these issues. Also, issues of social
policy, such as the extent to which a family should be permitted to
pass significant wealth down from generation to generation, permeate
the transfer tax system and cause those taxes to evoke a more heated
public response than even the income tax typically generates. Accord-
ing to some views, little or no wealth should be permitted to pass to a
younger generation; to other views, the imposition of a large bite on
property that was subject to income tax when initially acquired by the
[Vol. 34
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decedent is an especially unkind cut. These underlying social issues
and the strength of feelings they arouse make transfer taxation a
particularly interesting subject for scholarly inquiry.
For a decedent dying in 1981, the available unified credit essen-
tially insulates $175,625 of the decedent's property from transfer taxa-
tion. In other words, a $47,000 unified credit is the equivalent of
exempting $175,625 from the decedent's taxable estate. In adopting
ERTA, Congress increased the unified credit and therefore the
amount of exemption equivalent; this increase is phased in over a six-
year period. For a decedent dying in 1982, the exemption equivalent is
$225,000. This amount increases each year until 1987; for decedents
dying in that year or later, the amount of the exemption equivalent is
scheduled to be $600,000.
One might conclude that the staged increases in the unified credit
will so reduce the number of estates subject to transfer taxes as to
make that matter of interest to only a few highly specialized attorneys.
The increase in credit and therefore in the amount of exemption
equivalent may be somewhat less significant than appears on first
inspection. For example, let us assume that the nation will suffer
inflation for several years at a rate of 12% per year, and let us then
determine what the value of the amount of exemption equivalent
available in future years will be in terms of 1981 dollars. In other
words, to compare the $175,625 exemption equivalent that was avail-
able in 1981 with the $600,000 exemption equivalent that is scheduled
to become available by 1987, the two figures must be normalized by
determining the purchasing power that each would have in the same
year. One way to make this comparison is to determine the value that
$175,625 would have if it grew at a 12 % annually compounded rate.
After six years, the $175,625 figure would grow to $345,981 if
invested at 12% compounded annually. The 1981 exemption of
$175,625, therefore, is essentially equivalent to an exemption of
$346,000 in 1987 when the $600,000 exemption is scheduled to take
effect. The difference between that $600,000 exemption and the
$346,000 figure is the only real increase in exemption, assuming infla-
tion at the rate indicated, and even that difference has a reduced
significance when translated to 1981 values. By 1992, five years after
the exemption reaches the $600,000 plateau, the equivalent value of
the 1981 exemption of $175,625 will be greater than $611,000, assum-
ing that inflation continues at a 12% rate. Similarly, the amount of
exemption allowable only five years after the $600,000 figure first
comes into effect will be less, in true economic terms, than the exemp-
tion provided for decedents dying in 1981. Of course, inflation may be
brought under control; if so, the scheduled unified credit figures will
significantly reduce the reach of the tax. Inflation, however, could
worsen. It is, therefore, premature to announce the extinction of a
transfer tax system in this country.
1982]
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It is interesting to speculate on whether congressional action in the
near future will further erode the significance of the transfer tax
system or even eliminate it entirely, or whether Congress will reverse
the trend and broaden the reach of such taxes. I look forward to
reading the speculations on and analyses of these and other issues by
the prominent contributors to this symposium.
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